'Almost-certain eventualities' are liveness properties that hold with probability 1. 'Abstract probabilities' are probabilities in transition systems about which we know only that they are neither 0 nor 1.
Introduction
Liveness properties of 'standard', that is non-probabilistic transition systems rely only on the connectivity of the system (considered as a graph). The same is true in probabilistic systems, up to a point: 'almost-certain eventualities' depend only on 'abstract probabilities', not on precise probabilistic values.
A typical eventuality is loop termination, for example, expressed in temporal logic by the formula Q [¬G] where G is the loop guard; it is almost certain iff it occurs with probability 1. Over the state space {H, T } the 'coin-flipping' system s: = H p ⊕ s: = T , in which p ⊕ represents probabilistic choice, satisfies both Q [s=H] and Q[s=T ] almost certainly: no matter where the system is started, the state s will evenually be H, and will eventually be T , provided 0 < p < 1.
An abstract probability is one which -like p above -is known only to be neither 0 nor 1: beyond that, its precise value is immaterial for the conclusions that are to be drawn.
In this paper we concentrate on our quantitative extension qMµ [9, 10] of the modal µ-calculus [6] ; the extension in many cases acts as a probabilistic µ-calculus or even as a probabilistic temporal logic. (It can go beyond those, however, dealing directly with more general aspects like expected complexity [7] .)
Our principal contribution here is that the quantitative calculus can be specialised to a form of almost-certain eventualities and abstract probabilities, and that results are obtained that are similar to the 'traditional' probabilistic calculi: one does not need precise numeric values for the probabilistic transitions in the underlying system if one is interested only in almost-certain conclusions.
Our second contribution is to give a complexity bound for evaluation of almost certainties.
In the remainder of this section we describe the transition systems with which we will be concerned. Sections 2 and 3 review the existing calculi, in both their Boolean (traditional) and quantitative (our numeric extension) form; in Sections 4 and 5 we present our principal results. Complexity is considered in Section 7.
Standard transition systems and the µ-calculus
We say that a system is standard if it is not probabilistic or, if it is probabilistic, when its probabilities are all either 0 or 1. Standard transition systems over a state space S support a modal µ-calculus [6] for reasoning about their behaviour; expressions in the calculus denote Boolean-valued predicates (equivalently subsets of S), which are sets of states that can be shown with the calculus to lead to certain behaviours of the transition system.
The transition system can be given as elements of a state-to-state relation T : if (s, s ) ∈ T then moving from state s to state s is a possible transition; and if both (s, s ) and (s, s ) are in T , for s = s , then in a move from s the choice between s and s can be resolved either 'demonically' or 'angelically' depending on one's application.
The µ-calculus can be specialised to a form of temporal logic by defining // State space is Bool × N. temporal operators, like eventually Q above, within the calculus and then using only those, in effect a subset of the full language.
Probabilistic transition systems and qMµ
Probabilistic transition systems support a 'quantitative' modal µ-calculuswhich we call qMµ -whose expressions are real-rather than Boolean-valued over S; the expressions denote 'expected values' of random variables over probabilistic distributions on the state space. The transitions exhibit probabilistic nondeterminism as well as potentially the other two kinds.
As in the standard µ-calculus, temporal operators can be defined within qMµ: the result is a quantitative temporal logic which we call qTL [9, 10] .
The standard µ-calculus embeds into qMµ by taking predicates, or their equivalent subsets, to the corresponding characteristic functions; as a consequence, standard temporal logic embeds similarly into qTL.
For example, consider the probabilistic system of Fig. 1 . If b holds and n > 0, then b is eventually False only with probability 1/n -that is, the eventuality Q[¬b] depends on n's initial value -and in qTL (details below) we would simply say that Q[¬b] = 1/n in all states that satisfy b ∧ n>0. Clearly the 1/n result depends on the precise value 1/n 2 given in the transition: that is, the proof of Q[¬b] = 1/n in the calculus would involve quantitative reasoning based on that specific probability. (We give a proof in Sec. 3.2.)
On the other hand, in the probabilistic system
¬b is reached with probability 1, provided p is bounded away from zero. 3 We use a UNITY-like [2] pseudo-code to describe the transitions. 4 By "bounded away from zero" we mean that if we allow p to be some function p.(b, n) of the state, then we require the existence of a fixed ε > 0 such that p.(b, n) ≥ ε for all b, n. When S is finite, however, it is sufficient to say "p is non-zero"; and if p is some constant (e.g., is 1/2), then "p is non-zero" is sufficient whether S is finite or not. Note that in Fig. 1 the probability 1/n 2 is everywhere non-zero, but it is not bounded away
We say in that case that eventually ¬b occurs almost certainly over abstract probability p and, given that p's precise value is irrelevant for that conclusion, we could write the system (as Rao does for example [15] )
with the additional implication however that the probability is abstract for both alternatives -that is, the implicit p indicated by | is bounded away from both zero and one.
In the sequel we show that in qTL, at least for finite state spaces, the truth of almost-certain eventualities depends only on abstract probabilities, never on their precise values; and we show how to specialise the calculus so that it can act directly over transition systems described as at (2).
Summary of the µ-calculi
In this section we give a brief description of both the standard [6] and quantitative [9, 10] µ-calculi.
The standard calculus
Consider a transition system T : S ↔ S over a state space S. The standard modal µ-calculus comprises (expressions denoting) predicates of the form shown in Fig. 2 , allowing propositional operators, least-and greatest fixedpoints, and an implicit 'next-time' reference • to the effect of taking one step in T , with demonic resolution of any branching.
As an example, consider the transition system of Fig. 3 • For state s in S and predicate E we write E.s for the value of E at s, and we say that s satisfies E, or E holds at s, whenever that value is True. When E is given explicitly as a subset S of S, we can write s ∈ S for S .s.
• In this paper we interpret the • operator demonically with respect to the underlying transition system T , so that s satisfies •E precisely when for all s we have (s, s ) ∈ T ⇒ E.s .
• Predicate-to-predicate functions E are sometimes called predicate transformers. We apply µ and ν only to E that are ⇒-monotonic. Note that operator
• is monotonic by construction.
• The next-time operator • is interpreted demonically, and is assumed (beyond monotonicity) to satisfy the conjunctivity property
for all predicates P, Q. The transition system T is
The state space S is {a, b, c, d, e, f }, and P represents choice (interpreted demonically by •). For convenience we write the system using a programminglanguage like syntax, in which for example s = a denotes the predicate {a} and s: = c denotes the single transition S × {c}. The overall system is thus the relation T : = {a} × {c, d, e}. 
The quantitative calculus qMµ
Consider a probabilistic transition system over a state space S, this time of the form S → PS in which initial states are taken to sets (P) of distributions (·) over S.
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(Discrete) distributions S over S are maps from S into the unit 5 Note for comparison with the standard case that S ↔ S is just S → PS, so that we have merely changed the final 'set of points' S to the set of discrete distributions S (into which S can be embedded).
A quantitative µ-calculus expression E is of the form • The • operator is interpreted over T , and we assume here that it is demonic and probabilistic so that expression •E is the least (over the demonic nondeterminism) expected value (over the probabilistic nondeterminism) of E after the computational step. That is •E.s is the minimum over all distribu-
• Note that the special case •[P ].s gives the (demonically least) probability that one step from s will reach a state satisfying P , since the probability assigned an event P by a (state) distribution is equal to the expected value of its characteristic function [P ] over that same distibution: thus Exp D [P ] = Prob D P .
• We write for "is everywhere no more than", and , ≡ similarly.
• Operator • is assumed to satisfy the new property of sublinearity [12] , that is
where a, b, c ≥ 0 are scalars, juxtaposition is multiplication and A, B are expectations; truncated subtraction is defined
with lower syntactic precedence than +.
• Note that we write c both for the scalar and for the constant 'everywhere-c' function. •{c, d}.a = 2/3 when the probabilistic choice resolves to the right, the demonic choice will avoid d.
•{a}.a = 0 one step from a cannot reach a at all.
•{b}.b = 1 no explicit step is interpreted as skip. 
Operator & is useful because it both generalises Boolean conjunction 6 and specialises sublinearity: it is our 'best quantitative approximation' to conjunctivity (3).
In the system of Fig. 4 , because we have for example that {c} ≡ {c, d} & {c, e}, we can check (5) by verifying that
inspection of T Note that we have only an inequality, 7 whereas in the standard case (conjunctivity) we have equality. bounded up-continuity Provided S is finite, the set of expectations A is up-directed and A is bounded above, we have
down-continuity Provided S is finite and the set of expectations A is down-directed, we have
Specialisations to the temporal calculi
The modal calculi act as temporal calculi if one identifies specific types of expression for concepts like (among others) 'eventually', 'always' and 'unless' [4] . When based on the standard calculus, they give absolute (i.e., true or false) judgements; in the quantitative case, the judgements are probabilistic.
Standard temporal logic
We define some typical temporal operators in Fig. 6 . The role of conjunctivity (3) here is that it allows high-level proofs of temporal properties without referring directly to the underlying transition system. For example, one such property is the eventually-until lemma
which states that if P holds up to and including a possible step at which Q holds, and Q eventually does hold, then in fact P ∧ Q eventually holds. 9 We give the straightforward proof of that (Lem. A.1) as an example of the use of conjunctivity.
Quantitative temporal logic qTL
From here on we restrict our expectations to the range [0, 1] rather than R ≥ , using only operators for which [0, 1] is closed. (Note that feasibility above gives the closure of • itself.) over S as well; one of those is for example
for which •{c}.a is in fact as low as 1/3. It can be shown that sublinearity gives the highest estimate possible under those general circumstances: it is only as "pessimistic" as necessary. 8 Compare the PSP lemma of UNITY [2] . 9 Here for uniformity we use for 'entails', which is consistent with its quantitative definition since P Q iff [P ] [Q].
"eventually P "
If sufficiently many steps are taken, then P will hold.
"always P "
No matter how many steps are taken P will continue to hold.
"P unless Q"
No matter how many steps are taken, P will continue to hold, unless a state is reached in which Q holds. We write ": =" for "is defined to be". 
In qTL we restrict expectations to the range [0, 1] instead of R ≥ . In the quantitative case, we define the temporal operators as in Fig. 7 . Consider "QA" however: for general expectation A it is not helpful to interpret it as "the probability that eventually A is established", because the meaning of "establish A" is itself unclear if A is a number. So what does QA mean? (Similar remarks apply of course to the other temporal operators.)
It can be shown that the special case Q[P ] is indeed the probability of eventually establishing P .
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More generally [9] the expression QA is the supremum, over all strategies that determine in each state whether to take another transition or to stop, of the expected value of A when the strategy says "stop"; the strategy "never stop" gives 0 by definition.
The situation with the other operators is similar.
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Again (the generalisation of) conjunctivity plays an important role in highlevel reasoning. Using &-subdistribution, for example, we can prove a generalisation of (6); it is the quantitative eventually-until lemma
which we prove as Lem. A.2.
As an example of probabilistic eventualities, we return to the system Fig. 1 . We write out expectations as expressions over the program variables b, n, and calculate Q[¬b] directly (and unimaginatively) from the least-fixed-point limit implied by its definition (Fig. 7 ).
term 0: 0
•0 ≡ 0 by feasibility
. . . 10 As is usual, we mean by that probability the measure, in the Borel algebra of 'cones' within the tree of possible executions, of the set of paths along which P eventually occurs. 11 Again we have agreement with the standard case, since if P is guaranteed to hold eventually then the strategy "stop when P holds" will establish True; if P is not guaranteed to hold eventually then, given any strategy, demonic choice could force either a "stop" in a state where P is false or an infinite run, also giving False (by definition).
so that we have
Q[¬b] ≡
terms ascending, so k agrees with lim k→∞
That is, termination is certain if ¬b holds (at the start), and occurs with probability 1/n if it does not.
Abstract reasoning in qTL
We have now completed our review of the existing calculi, and turn to our present contribution.
At the end of Sec. 3, we gave a calculation of • [¬b] for the system of Fig. 1 .
In System (1) following it, a similar calculation would be 12 term 0: 0
12 This heavy-handed 'limit' approach is not the only way to calculate Q [¬b] here: an alternative is to show from the definitions that
holds for this system, whence rearrangement and dividing by p gives us Q[¬b] ≡ 1. But the point about explicit treatment of p remains.
. . .
Our aim is simply to show that in abstract systems like (1) it is possible to avoid explicit numeric calculations like the above.
The main technical result will be that the floor · and ceiling · operators can abstract from the 'intermediate' values lying strictly between 0 and 1: in finite state spaces we prove
whose left-hand side is 1 if Q[P ] is almost certain, and 0 otherwise; and the constructions · £ · and Q· used in the right-hand side will be shown to depend only on abstract probabilities. We begin with a general discussion.
'Almost-certain' is special for probabilistic systems
We place our work in context by recalling the following facts from finite-state Markov process theory, but in our notation. Let S be the finite state space.
• Operator • is a transition function over S. • State s is reachable from state s iff • n {s }.s > 0 for some finite n (the number of transitions taken).
• A subset P of S is closed (with respect to
• The probability of reaching P in one step from s -call it • 1 .P.s -is
•[P ].s.
• The probability of reaching P for the first time at the n th step, for n > 1,
• The probability of eventually reaching a subset P from state s, say • ∞ .P.s,
which is also known as the first-passage probability from s to P .
• • ∞ .{s}.s is the probability of eventual return to s.
In that notation we can state the following theorem for Markov processes: Let • represent a Markov matrix, let S be a finite state space and s a state; and let C be the set of reachable states from s. Then
• ∞ .{s} for some p > 0.
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The important thing to note about this result is that p is only specified to be greater than 0. Equivalently, only the connectivity of the Markov process is important, rather than the actual values of the probabilities -which is why the proof rule for • ∞ .{s}.s is so simple.
We regard the result as a form of completeness, because it states that the connectivity information is sufficient to establish the eventuality.
Our aim is to demonstrate that for probabilistic and demonic programs, a simpler calculus is all that is needed to prove (eventuality) properties with probability 1: as for standard programs only the "connectivity" of the program is important and not the actual probabilistic values. We will prove a similar completeness result for general eventuality properties. For many probabilistic programs that will provide a sufficient proof rule, since probability 1 (or not) is all that is of interest.
Other recent work on the special properties of "probability 1" events in programs includes results of Rao [15] , Pnueli/Zuck [13] and Hart/Sharir/Pnueli [16] . Their completeness results in some cases assume various kinds of fairness.
Relevant properties of our temporal operators
We concentrate on next-time •, eventually Q and unless £. The following properties can be proved directly from the operators' definitions [10] or -in some cases -have been given above.
Lemma 4.1 Properties of next-time -For all expectations A, B,
(i) •A & •B •(A & B). (ii) If A A , then •A •A . (iii) •1 ≡ 1.
Lemma 4.2 Properties of eventually -For all expectations A, B,
13 Note that p [C] .s is just (p if s ∈ C else 0), so that -after applying both sides to s -the inequality p [C] • ∞ .{s} says that for all s ∈ C the first-passage probability • ∞ .{s}.s from s to s is at least p.
Lemma 4.3 Properties of unless -For all expectations A, B,
(
From these we have a form of completeness, based on the fact that the above properties determine the action of their respective operators.
Theorem 4.4 Standard completeness -If •, P, Q are interpreted over a finite state (standard) transition system, then the above properties are sufficient to calculate Q[P ] and [P ] £ [Q] -only the transitions must be specified.
Although for probabilistic programs the same idea of finding the least solution to an equation remains valid (and is in that sense complete 15 ), even for finite-state programs discovering the actual real number values can still be rather tortuous, as we saw above. Indeed that is always going to be the case for non-(0-1) properties.
We desire a completeness property like Thm. 4.4 for abstract probabilistic programs -the idea is that if we only specify the transitions, merely indicating when they are probabilistic, then we only need use standard techniques, without having to introduce all the complications of the full quantitative calculus.
Our first task is to show how to extract information "with probability 1". From this point we assume that the transition system is probabilistic, and that the state space is finite. Recall our restriction in qTL to expectations that take values only in the unit interval [0, 1] rather than in the more general range R ≥ .
Floor and ceiling for 'almost certain'
Our principal tool will be the ceiling · and floor · operators (both taking expectations to expectations), defined With them we can write "almost certainly Q[P ]" as Q[P ] , and our aim is to calculate that from the 'connectivity' -the abstract probabilistic properties -of •.
Floor and ceiling for the 'connectivity' of •
We also use ceiling and floor to extract the connectivity (rather than the particular values of) the probabilistic transitions . With them we define two 'derived' transition operators, one converting probabilities to angelic choice, and the other converting them to demonic. 
Properties of • a and • d
Before proceeding to almost-eventually properties, we need the following technical results for our connectivity operators. 
• is an expression containing the operator •, and F.
• d similarly, and they together satisfy E.
Proof. it will turn out that we can reach QA indirectly, via Q·· , at least when A is standard; for that we begin with the following lemma: In the next section we show that we achieve equality when A is standard.
We treat QA similarly (lfp-distribution (Lem. 4.7) and Lem. A.4).

Proof. We show that A •( QA £ A)
QA £ A, which allows us to apply Property (iii) of Lem. 4.2:
A •( QA £ A) QA £ A iff A •( QA £ A) A ( QA •( QA £ A)) definition £ iff •( QA £ A) QA arithmetic; A QA (Lem. 4.2) iff •( QA £ A) A •QA
0-1 laws and temporal logic
In this section we show how the introduction of a 0-1 law (or axiom) is all that is needed to show that Q[P ] does indeed rely only on connectivity.
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We gave an example of the 0-1 law for purely probabilistic programs; the idea has been extended to probabilistic/demonic programs [5, 11] using the notation and ideas of temporal logic.
Lemma 5.1 0-1 Law -For any expectation A, predicate P and probability [11, Lem. 6 
Proof. The full proof -allowing demonic nondeterminism and possiblyaborting transitions -is beyond the scope of this paper; but it is a simple consequence of 0-1 results on the probabilistic treatment of loops
.1 p10]. As an illustration, however, we give a proof entirely in qTL (Thm. A.7) for the restricted case of non-demonic and terminating transitions. P
The above law is valid for all state spaces: but for finite state spaces it has a much more compact formulation. 
We now show that (8) holds iff (9) holds.
by cases on P.s
whence our assumption (8) gives us A £ [P ] Q[P ], as desired overall. (9) implies (8) From Lems. 4.3(i) and 4.2(i) we have
hence we have immediately from (9) that
Proof. In finite models we may use the second form Lem. 5.2 of the 0-1 law; the result then follows from Lemma 4.9. P
Cor. 5.3 is the key to showing that for probability-1 properties, connectivity is sufficient. 
Proof. Cor. 5.3 gives us that Q[P ] ≡ Q[P ] £ [P ], from which we have
Since · £ · and Q· depend only on the connectivity, the result follows. P
Example
Consider the abstract system s: = H | s: = T , 19 To see that (9) does not hold for infinite state spaces, consider this system over S : = Z that defines a random walker on the integers: and the interpretation of the formula is via the quantitative µ-calculus, as given earlier in Fig. 7 . The formula is said to be almost certain at a state s of a given transition system if it evaluates to 1 at s. where the "|" represents an abstract p ⊕ with 0 < p < 1. The probabilistic connectivity is given by
, because there is a non-zero probability of establishing any non-empty predicate over {H, T }.
because there is a non-zero probability of avoiding any non-total predicate over {H, T }.
Now we look at the almost-certain eventuality Q{H} ; we have
Lems. 4.3(ii), 4.1(iii)
Complexity analysis
We now look briefly at the time-complexity of evaluating almost-certainties in qTL: the precise language and its interpretation is set out in Fig. 8 ; and our result is that the complexity of evaluating Φ over transition system T is linear in the number of temporal operators in Φ and in the number of transitions in T . We outline a proof of that in this section. Throughout the following we will use the specific formula Φ 0 , defined
as a running example: we want to evaluate Φ 0 .
"angelic-eventually A"
"demonic-always A"
These operators are analogues of the ∃•, ∀P etc. of conventional (probabilistic) temporal logic. To distribute · inwards we use the equalities set out in this lemma:
Proof. Only (12) 
in which all explicit expectations (A, B, C) have been made standard ( A , B , C ).
Convert Q's to standard operators
The procedure of the previous section eliminated all properly probabilistic modal operators, replacing them with demonic versions, except for Q. To deal with Q we use our main result Cor. 5.3 which, combined with the above and Lem. 4.8, allows us to state that
provided A is standard. Since the inward propagation of the previous section has made all sub-formulae standard, indeed (15) applies: in the case of Φ 0 we can continue
where
. We use the 'where'-clause to remember that X has been duplicated, so that we need calculate it only once. (15) is properly noted. Thus our result will follow if we can establish that evaluation of each of those operators is linear in the size of the transition system. We discuss that briefly for each operator in turn; in each case A, B are standard.
Evaluate
• d A -• d treats the system as entirely demonic. Examine all states, and select only those all of whose outgoing transitions lead into A. Q a A -If the original system contains demonic (as well as probabilistic) choice, then the system will be treated as demonic/angelic by Q a -that is, although the probabilistic choice is made angelic, the pure demonic choice is retained. The operational behaviour for each complete transition is a 'first-stage' demonic choice of 'half-transition' followed by a 'secondstage' angelic choice of half-transition. Start with the set of states A, and for each of its states follow all second-stage angelic half-transitions back, colouring their sources; if the source was uncoloured, continue on to follow back the first-stage halftransition, decrementing the 'first-stage transition count' of its originating state (prepared beforehand).
Having done that for all of A, go over the transitions again this time deleting all second-stage transitions followed, and adding all states whose first-stage count has become zero, in that case deleting the first-stage transitions as well.
Continue the process until no states are added; each transition will have been followed at most a constant number of times (amortised). In either case, delete the transition; and repeat the process with the added states, stopping the whole procedure when no new states are added. The result is the complement of the accumulated states; and in the process, each transition is considered at most once.
In the case of Φ 0 we carry out four calculations from the above, two within X and two outside it.
Conclusion
Abstract probabilities and 0-1 laws have long been recognised as important techniques for simplifying analysis in probabilistic systems. However the tendency has been to use formulations of those laws at the level of models [1, 15, 17] and not to integrate them formally as axioms of program logic, as is customary for other operational phenomena.
There are certainly difficulties in importing well-understood concepts directly from probability theory to a computational context, due to the complicating factor of nonderterminism: it is not present in classical probability theory. Many of those difficulties can be resolved using the probabilistic version of Dijkstra/Hoare-style program logic [12] which is intended to deal naturally with nondeterminism, probability and their interaction. In addition temporal logic provides a framework for handling properties of infinite (repeated) executions of programs -precisely the situation where 0-1 laws begin to bite. The resulting fragment of qMµ described in this paper, and used to define temporal operators, is thus ideal for studying probability, nondeterminism and 0-1 laws all together.
In qMµ we find, as in other works, that probabilistic choice when used specifically for "probability-1" properties can (to an extent) be interpreted angelically. But this is definitely not sound in all situations, and sometimes a demonic interpretation is necessary.
For example consider the formula Q[s=2] interpreted in the system defined by
Recall that "|" stands for some p ⊕ with 0 < p < 1.
A direct calculation shows that the probability of eventually reaching s=2 is strictly less than 1 (unless the system is initially in that state). But an angelic interpretation for | in Q[s=2] would give 1, and therefore must be unsound. To see that a demonic interpretation is also unsound consider the probability of eventually reaching s=0. Again a direct calulation shows that it is 1 irrespective of the initial state, whereas a demonic interpretation of | in the formula Q[s=0] gives 0 (except from s=0 initially).
Indeed finding an optimal balance between the two interpretations -in order to maintain soundness in all situations -is a major challenge. As we do, Rao [15] uses two interpretations of probabilistic choice, though he imposes fairness on the execution sequences, which we do not. Others' work (Hart et al. [5] , Vardi [17] use similar ideas, but are model-rather than logic-based.
The emphaisis of our work has been to clarify exactly when each of the two interpretations of | is appropriate for the interpretation of temporal formulae in probabilstic systems. Granting the 0-1 law the status of a logical axiom proved to be critical in doing so.
To summarise, we have shown that the demonic interpretation goes with greatest fixed-points ("always" and "unless") and "=1" probabilities , and that the angelic goes with least fixed points ("eventually") and "> 0" probabilities, finally leaving the 0-1 law standing out as the key idea underlying their combination in "=1" eventually properties.
The second contribution of this work is the complexity of the model checking problem. The result sketched in Sec. 7 shows that for the logic corresponding to "worst case" probabilistic CTL the complexity is linear in the size of the formula and the size of the underlying transition system. That matches the best known complexity for nonprobabilistic CTL interpreted over nonprobabilistic transition systems [3] .
propositional reasoning; conjunctivity (3) 
Q(J & [¬G]) .
Lem. A.2
Now by arithmetic J & Q[¬G] is just p(I £ [¬G]), and J & [¬G] is just p[¬G]
whence -using scaling of Q -we end up with (A.6), as required. P
